group in the society. If one assumes that the dominant economic (and likely political) group is Anglos and that groups in power desire to stay in power, then the question is whether or not Latinos and African Americans will work together to counter the Anglo biases in the present system. The logic of a Latino-Black coalition is that both minority groups are likely to perceive they are discriminated against in the political system and thus likely to form a coalition to attempt to gain control over government or a fair share of policy benefits (see Portes 1984; de la Garza et al. 1992 ; DeSipio 1996; Sigelman and Welch 1991).
Previous research suggests that all three scenarios are possible. Research has found cooperation among minority groups in a "rainbow coalition" approach (Henry 1980 The "independence" scenario has been supported in some research and some specific policy domains (on voting see Morris 2000) . McClain and Tauber (1998: 240) found no significant relationship between African Americans and Latinos on educational policy outcomes. While minorities may face competition with Anglos, McClain and Tauber (242) found "neither widespread direct political competition nor mutual support between Blacks and Latinos." In other words, Black and Latino education levels were essentially unrelated to each other. These findings contrast with Meier and Stewart's (1991) assessment of education; they found that education policies such as grouping and tracking generated trade offs between Latino and African-American students. Increases in the number of Black students in special education classes, gifted classes or in disciplinary actions were associated with declines in similar outcomes for Latino students. Meier and Stewart argued that these relationships reflected intragroup conflict but did not determine whether that conflict was inherent between the two groups or was mediated by the dominant Anglo group.
Finally, while status similarities can form the base for coalition building, they may also contribute to competition between groups (McClain 1993). A host of research suggests that inter-minority tensions have undercut the potential for coalition building (Cohen 1982 
EDUCATION POLICY AND MINORITY RELATIONS
Education policies and school districts are ideal for examining questions of inter-racial/ethnic competition or cooperation. First, education is a crucial policy area, one that affects a multitude of other policy arenas. Education is touted as the key to upward-mobility; it translates directly into differences in income and employment, and indirectly into differences in access to housing, recreation, and future political influence (Smith 2003; Jencks and Phillips 1998). Second, public education also accounts for a significant portion of public expenditures. School systems are the nation's largest public employer and provide numerous jobs that are highly prized in minority communities (Rich 1996 Meier and Stewart (1991) , looking at ability grouping and tracking rather than overall levels of educational attainment, revealed essentially conflictual relationships whereby the gains of one group were offset by the losses of the other. Finally, education is also a policy area that previous research has singled out as having experienced a change in the nature of minority-minority relationships (McClain and Tauber 1998).
The literature, therefore, has found support for three hypotheses. Our objective is empirical, to determine which of these three hypotheses hold in contemporary education policy H1: Representational and policy gains by Blacks will be negatively associated with representation and policy gains by Latinos, and vice versa.
H2: Representational and policy gains by Blacks will be positively associated with representation and policy gains by Latinos, and vice versa.
H3: Representational and policy gains by Blacks will be unrelated to representation and policy gains by Latinos.
DATA AND METHODS
The data for this study come from school districts in Texas from 1997 to 1999. Texas is an excellent site because it has numerous school districts with large enrollments of Only" referenda and the recent municipal elections in Los The multi-year nature of the data set means we must be concerned with problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity To control for serial correlation, a set of dummy variables representing individual years is included in all models. Examining the residuals for each year showed little heteroscedasticity so no such corrections were used. We also checked each regression for collinearity problems and found that levels of collinearity were all within normal bounds.
The theoretical question we address involves tradeoffs between minority groups. In a competitive situation, gains by African-Americans would be associated with losses by Latinos and vice versa. As an illustration, an increase in African-American teachers might affect the ability of a district to hire more Latino teachers simply because every district only has a limited number of teaching positions. Similarly, hiring more Latino teachers could limit the opportunities to hire more African-American teachers. This reciprocal causation means that ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is an inappropriate method of analysis because OLS could not distinguish between the influence that African-Americans have on Latinos as distinct from the influence that Latinos have on African-Americans. The appropriate technique, therefore, is two stage least squares that addresses the reciprocal causation via a set of exogenous instrumental variables that are assumed to influence one but not both endogenous variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).2 The instrumental variables are used in the first stage regressions to predict each of the dependent variables. These predicted variables, termed "purged" variables, are then used in place of the endogenous variables when they are treated as independent variables. DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES
To determine any possible tradeoffs between AfricanAmericans and Latinos, we examine three dependent variables: the percentage African-American (Latino) administrators in the district, the percentage African-American (Latino) teachers in the district, and the pass rate on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) exam by both AfricanData and documentation for this study can be obtained from the authors. 2 We assume that the interaction between minority groups is instantaneous or at least shorter than a full year. We have explicitly opted to use percentages for both access to positions and policy outcomes rather than ratios comparing how well Blacks and Latinos perform in relation to their population numbers. First, influence in public policy is likely to be affected by raw numbers or percentages rather than on whether or not proportionality is achieved. An African-American population of 30 percent with 20 percent representation on the school board is likely to be better represented than a African-American population of 5 percent with only 10 percent of the seats (even though the latter case has a ratio almost three times as large 2.0 v. .67). At the teaching level, percentages indicate the probability that any given minority student will come into contact with or notice a minority teacher, something that is more likely when percentages are large even if the representation ratio is less than one. Second, to the extent that the allocation of positions is essentially patronage; patronage is not negated by proportionality. A larger percentage of the "spoils" is always better regardless of the proportionality of the distribution. Third, ratios are often distorted when the minority population is small, and an upper limit exists on ratios when the minority population is large. These numeric restrictions create limits on the variation in artificial terms rather than the real limits of percentages (0 and 100 percent). When the dependent variable shifts to teachers, representation will be measured at the school administrator level. When the focus is test scores, bureaucratic representation will be measured by the ethnic composition of the teaching faculty (Lipsky 1980 (Cole 1986 : 332). Third, minority teachers mitigate the negative consequences of grouping, tracking, and discipline either by decisions or by influencing overall policy (Meier and Stewart 1991). Fourth, minority teachers might influence the behavior of majority teachers who in turn rely on teaching methods less likely to disadvantage minority students. Only the first of these methods requires a given minority student to come into contact with a specific minority teacher. The others can work indirectly so that the appropriate unit of analysis is at the organizational level rather than the individual level.
Controls
We also include a variety of other factors that influence education performance in the model. These are the usual suspects culled from the education literature and are frequently used in education production functions. Production functions typically include measures of environmental constraints, resources applied to the process, and district policies designed to improve performance.
In the context of educational policy, poverty is a serious constraint on student performance. Poverty not only means students lack access to learning tools in the home-computers, educational toys, etc.-but is also correlated with a less stable and less supportive home environment, e.g., single parent households, high rates of teen pregnancy, and low educational expectations (Necochea and Cune 1996; Fuller et al. 1996) . While the components of poverty that contribute directly to lower educational performance are less well defined, research consistently shows that poverty is negatively linked to education performance (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Our measure of student poverty is the percent of students who qualify for free or reduced-price meals all students not just Latino or Black students, we also included two measures from the U.S. Census-the percentage of Black/Latino families living in poverty and the percentage of Blacks/Latinos over age 25 who have graduated from high school. We expect the relationships to performance to be negative for the school lunch and poverty measure and positive for the education measure.
The relationship between expenditures and educational outcomes is one of the most contested relationships in educational policy Examining a wealth of studies, Hanushek (1986 Hanushek ( , 1989 Hanushek ( , 1996 Education policies are intended to influence student performance. One such policy involves the learning environment-class size. Although many studies indicate that only major changes in class size are effective, schools with 3 How much of educational funds to spend on instruction versus other matters is clearly a policy decision. We investigated whether this policy decision affected the relationships found in this study, and they did not. The percentage of total educational funds spent on instruction was essentially incorporated via other measures such as teacher salaries and class size. Whatever the reason that school districts allocate funds away from instruction to other factors, race and ethnicity were not part of the process. 4 The relationship for state aid is puzzling on one dimension since funds spent on education should be equally valuable regardless of the source of funds. State funds, however, are not subject to local political pressures to keep the tax rate low, and the relatively recent rise in state funds means they can be targeted to new programs. These funds, as a result, might give local educational leaders more freedom to spend the funds on programs that aid minority students. The fact remains that state funds are more positively correlated with minority student outcomes than are local funds.
in the school lunch program. Because this measure includes - Teachers are a crucial element in a student's educational environment. In a profession based on life-long learning, experienced teachers should prove to be an advantage, especially in multiracial districts. Our measure is the average years of teacher experience, which should be positively related to student performance.
Finally, the test score model controls for the overall quality of the schools so that any results are not a function of African Americans or Latinos attending generally better or worse schools. Measuring the quality of schools is not an easy task. Weiher (2000) argues that better schools will benefit students of all races and proposes that the performance of nonminority students is a good surrogate for school quality In addition to serving as a proxy for school quality, our measure, the percentage of Anglo students passing the TAAS, could also tap into peer effects. Students generally perform at higher levels when they are placed in environments with children who are already high performers (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Table 1 presents descriptive information for key variables. African Americans have a greater presence on the school board and among teachers and administrators in the districts in our sample. Latinos, however, have a larger share of the student body in our selected schools, as well as slightly higher test scores. Table 5 . Thus, in terms of administrators and teachers (jobs) our data suggest a competitive relationship between minority groups. In both cases bureaucratic representation plays a major role, as demonstrated by the strong positive relationships between administrators and teachers. 5We thank an anonymous reviewer who suggested this line of analysis as a way to tap the degree of conflict in the relationships that we have uncovered. Table 4 , therefore, the linkage between administrators and teachers was only through influence on hiring teachers of the same ethnicity as the administrators.
FINDINGS

We also then included the percentage of Latino administrators in the African
Turning to actual policy outcomes (student performance) presents a different picture. Table 7 presents the determinants of Latino test scores. Here minority-minority student performance is complementary The coefficient for the African-American pass rate, controlling for other factors including the Anglo pass rate, is significant and positive. The higher the African-American (and Anglo) pass rate, the higher the Latino pass rate. The coefficient is large (.44 ) and strongly significant (t = 12.99). The differences between administrators and teachers on the one hand, where there is competition between the groups, and the student performance variables, where no competition is found, is suggestive. Each district has a limited number of administrators and teachers. Scarcity, thus, induces competition. Actual student achievement, however, The direct effects of school board members on increasing the conflict over administrative positions but the lack of such effects from administrators on teachers or teachers on students, implies that electoral politics might simply be more conflictual than bureaucratic politics. Perhaps the simplicity of election campaigns reduces issues to "us versus them" issues more readily than the complexities of bureaucratic politics. Such a conclusion at this point, however, would be pure speculation since the present study is the first to compare these sets of relationships in this manner.
CONCLUSIONS
McClain (1993) identified three scenarios for minorityminority relationships: competition, independence, and cooperation. Our answer is that it all depends. We find that in the education arena, some relationships between African Americans and Latinos are characterized by conflict and competition. We also find that, in other areas, the relationship is complementary. As might be expected, where scarce positions are involved, e.g., school administrators and faculty, competition is the norm. There is after all only one school principal in each school. If the principal is African American, she cannot be a Latina. There usually is only one teacher in each classroom. If that teacher is a Latino, he cannot be African American. We do not suggest that the competition for scarce positions is necessarily a function of race and ethnicity. It maybe a natural consequence of scarcity. Such a situation, however, contributes to the competition between two groups generally on the outside attempting to break into the inner group.
In the area of student performance, however, the two minority groups are complementary. If African-American student scores are higher, so are Latino scores. At first blush, it would appear as if either the independence or cooperative scenarios could describe these relationships. We believe, however, that the relationship is complementary rather than independent. Previous research on minority education has established that the presence of minority board members contribute to increased numbers of minority administrators and then to increased numbers of minority teachers. This research suggests also that the impact of these increases on minority students is positive. In such cases, for example, more minority students are placed in gifted and talented programs or provide access to other more challenging curricula (Polinard et al. 1994 ). We suggest it would follow that one effect of these changes in the long run would be higher minority student scores on such standardized tests as the TAAS. Although that research focused on co-ethnic minority relationships (i.e., Latino board members, administrators, teachers and students), we suggest that the presence of a minority teacher could have a positive impact on the minority students in the classroom, even if the race/ethnicity of the teacher and students is different. Previous research also notes that in this context minority gains do not come at a cost to Anglo performance (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999). Policies that improve student performance can be designed to benefit all students; our data show clearly that intra-minority student performance is not a zero-sum game. While there may only be one principal or teacher, and, consequently, only one minority in that position, all students may score high on standardized tests.
Although the purpose of this study was empirical, it has ramifications for coalition strategies. We think that coalitions are easier to form when the payoffs are not obviously zero sum. In the strategic choice to use policy or patronage as the basis for a coalition, some policies, those with a nonzero sum nature, may be more promising. Not all policies, however, can be turned into positive-sum games. Coalition leaders need to seek out specific policies with potential positive-sum characteristics. While we do not intend to down play the importance of jobs, especially jobs with discretion to influence policy outcomes, a focus on some types of policy outcomes could offer the promise of providing benefits for a larger number of persons. A policy focus, therefore, might be an appropriate way to restructure the political agenda involving questions of race and ethnicity. Future research on minority coalitions needs to address which policies under what types of circumstances are amenable to coalition building via cooperative strategies. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY ber/December): 689-99.
